This paper argues that the concept of social accountability can be useful to explain the transparency and accountability policies adopted by international organizations (IOs). Social accountability is understood as the contributions of civil society actors in the functioning of IOs. In international politics, the recent development of IOs' accountability mechanisms has been challenged by the absence of a world government and the impact of inter-state power relations on the decision-making process of international organizations. The presence of civil society actors can reduce the gap between international organizations and citizens affected by their activities. This article resorts to a specific case study: the World Bank Inspection Panel. The analysis revealed the role of civil society actors in the creation, operation and outcomes of this institution. This analysis shows that the concept of social accountability can be adequate to explain not only the Inspection Panel, but other mechanisms recently developed by international organizations.
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actors. The first is directly related to the availability of information about the acts practiced by the agents that operate in the state sphere. It is related, therefore, to the instruments of greater or lesser transparency of government. Responsiveness, in turn, means that the preferences of the constituents are effectively considered in the work of those who hold positions in the state bureaucracy. Accountable agencies, institutions and governments are therefore transparent and responsive to society and citizens. In this sense, the discussion about accountability answers an essential question: who controls the controller?
For these constitutive elements to be operationalized, democratic societies have built a series of institutional mechanisms, which traditionally comprise two types of accountability, horizontal and vertical. Guillermo O'Donnell's analyses (1998; help in the conceptualization of these two types of accountability.
As its name suggests, horizontal accountability is constituted by the controls that agencies of the three branches of government -legislative, executive and judicialexercise on each other. Of course, the effectiveness of these controls is a function of the symmetry of power and of the relative autonomy of each of these branches in relation to the other two. Multiple mechanisms, organs and/or structures can be cited in this type, such as courts of accounts, parliamentary committees of inquiry, presidential veto, judicial power to judge the acts of other branches, and so on. In this sense, horizontal accountability takes place within government and is closely related to the checks and balances of the American pluralist tradition that dates, at least, from the 'Federalist Papers'.
Vertical accountability is exercised by the constituents over the incumbents, by the voters over the elected. Its main mechanism is, therefore, the elections. The assumption in this case is that citizens would tend to reward good political actors and punish the bad ones by voting; thus, vertical accountability involves actors both within and outside government. It is necessary to emphasize that O'Donnell (2006) classifies the media and the civil society actions focused on accountability in this type, considering them as limited in their absence of formal enforcement power -this is the reason why in this section of the article, such actions will be qualified as part of a social type of accountability.
The literature on the subject presents an expressive set of limitations in the functioning of accountability mechanisms, especially in the new polyarchies of the soAlexsandro Eugenio Pereira, Rodrigo Rossi Horochovski, Mariana Mattos de Almeida Cruz & Noeli Rodrigues (2017) 11 (1) e0002 -5/28 called third wave of democratization. In the case of horizontal accountability, the authoritarian tradition in which the executive historically prevails over other branches, especially at the subnational levels of government, hampers the proper operation of checks and balances (O'DONNELL, 2000; SCHMITTER, 1999) .
Authors such as José María Maravall (1999) and John Ferejohn (1999) point out that effective vertical accountability in any political system is practically impossible. The combination of fiduciary mandate, information asymmetry favorable to political agents, and episodic elections entails a relatively high degree of independence of the political agent's action from the voter who ultimately nominated him. A disconnection between campaign commitments and effective action in the offices is produced, because, when pushed to the limit, the politician can argue that the circumstances in which such commitments were made change and cause changes in courses of action. Proponents of this position argue that the politician's fear of the voter is too diffuse to ensure that he has his will in fact considered, leaving him awaiting the next election. In environments marked by deficits in civic culture, this situation is aggravated. Jonathan Fox (2000) , for example, uses the term reverse vertical accountability to designate the strong tendency in these societies for politicians to control voters, either by patronage or by violence.
Beyond these limits, horizontal and vertical types are insufficient to account for the performance of non-state actors in the operationalization of accountability. In view of that, Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti (2000) propose the concept of social accountability, which "involves actions carried out by actors with different degrees of organization who are recognized as legitimate claimants of rights" (SMULOVITZ and PERUZZOTTI, 2000, p. 03) . This is, therefore, the social control exercised outside the state sphere by actors of civil society and the media. Among the actions that comprise this type, the authors cite: the application of strategies of pressure and denunciation; the transformation of local issues into regional, national or international issues (something very close to what Elmer Schattschneider (1960) calls expansion of the scope of conflicts); and the threat of harm the reputation of political agents and organizations that act inappropriately.
One might object that actions that comprise strategies such as those listed above would not properly be accountability mechanisms, as there is no direct power of investigation, sanction and punishment. However, as the concept formulators themselves state, the main reason for the existence of these actions is precisely to Accountability in International Organizations: the case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993 (2017) 
Accountability in international organizations
In international politics, existing accountability mechanisms operate in a context characterized by the absence of a world government, which limits the possibility of functioning of these mechanisms. For Grant and Keohane (2005) and Keohane (2006) , international organizations develop actions that affect people in various parts of the world. Therefore, they must face the challenge of creating accountability mechanisms through which they can establish closer links with citizens, non-state actors and national governments affected by their decisions.
For Grant and Keohane (2005) , current debates are focused on claims to improve accountability and limit abuses of power in international politics. From these debates, relevant questions have emerged, such as: 01. how should we think about international accountability when there is no global democracy? 02. who should be responsible and according to what standards? (GRANT and KEOHANE, 2005, p. 29) . The answer to these questions implies recognizing that there is a distinction between two models of accountability that can be identified in international politics: participation and delegation. The two models raise a third crucial question in assessing accountability mechanisms in international politics: who has the right to control the holder of power? (GRANT and KEOHANE, 2005, p. 31) . In the participation model, holders of power are evaluated by those affected by their actions. In the delegation model, performance is evaluated by those who entrust power to the holders, that is, the national states (GRANT and KEOHANE, 2005, pp. 32-33) .
Robert Dahl (1999, p. 19) IOs, there would be, in fact, a democratic deficit (MORAVCSIK, 2004, p. 336) . This is also suggested by Woods and Narlikar (2001, p. 573 (2001) . Therefore, the model of delegation of power by Grant and Keohane (2005) prevails. Delegation to IOs involves the weight of states in shaping the direction of organizations, in providing key resources for their activities and in decision-making.
For David Held (2004, pp. 369-370) This set of problems raised by Held (2004) appears in the experiences of accountability in international politics. In these experiences, the participation model proposed by Grant and Keohane (2005) is more difficult to achieve because it involves Cohen and Arato (1994) , the civil society is constituted as a space of autonomy of diversified actors in opposition to the coercive logic of the state and of the market. According to Cohen and Arato (1994) , civil society actors seek to promote participatory and deliberative processes through which they can influence the economy and the state and develop their capacity to control both. They are involved in the defense of numerous social and environmental causes, such as the guarantee of diffuse rights (gender, ethnic, ecological, etc) , the respect for indigenous peoples, the protection of the environment, and others.
Civil society groups a set of actors such as social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, varied types of civil and community associations and individuals. Civil society expresses itself, therefore, both through organized and not organized ways; it is possible to find references to these expressions in several works (GOHN, 2014; LAVALLE, CASTELLO and BICHIR, 2004; MAIA, 2006 In the following sections, the Inspection Panel will be examined, taking into account the theoretical issues raised in these first two sections of the article.
A brief description of the Inspection Panel
This section To be registered, an inspection request must meet the following eligibility criteria: 01. requesters must prove that they live in areas affected by IBRD or IDA Projects or Programs or that they represent affected persons; 02. requesters must allege that there has been social or environmental harm generated by the projects or that they may occur in the future; 03. requesters need to show that the harm generated was due Projects financed by the WB. These forms of action will be then examined.
Civil society in the creation and revisions of the Panel
In 1993 ___________________________________________________________________________ case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993 ( 
Civil society in the functioning of the Inspection Panel
The Inspection Panel is seen as a mechanism to give voice to local communities and to citizens located, especially, in developing countries, affected by environmental and social impacts generated by the Bank-financed projects (BARLAS and TASSONI, 2015; BARROS, 2001; BUNTAINE, 2015; EBRAHIM and HERZ, 2007; LUKAS, 2015; NIELSON and TIERNEY, 2003; WONG and MAYER, 2015) .
Nevertheless, the lack of information from the local population and the technical nature of the process lead the requesters to seek the assistance of experts, such as lawyers, and even specialists from civil society (TREAKLE, FOX and CLARK, 2003, p. 
___________________________________________________________________________
11 The Inspection Panel can be characterized as a horizontal accountability mechanism of the World Bank, as Woods and Narlikar (2001, p. 576) argue, because it was created to be independent and with monitoring functions of IBRD and IDA. These functions approximate the horizontal accountability agencies mentioned by G. O'Donnell (1998) .
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See http://goo.gl/3abpKh. Panel (1993 Panel ( -2015 (2017) 11 (1) e0002 -16/28 It is also important to note that most requests, formulated with the participation of civil society organizations, involve local actors and grassroots movements. Table 02 below summarizes the information on the types of requesters. With regard to the admissibility of requests, it can be seen on Graph 02 that 59 cases (or 57% of the total) were admitted by the Panel or generated revisions by the Bank's Management. The remaining requests were not registered or admitted for investigation (44 cases or 43% of the total). Admissibility is understood here as: 01.
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cases that have generated detailed investigation by Panel members; and 02. requests that led the Bank to propose revisions to the projects before authorizing full investigations. The practice of proposing action plans prior to the investigation was more frequent prior to the Panel's second revision, but was only completely removed by the Bank's Management after 1999. These requests could be included among the admitted cases, as the Management acknowledged the need for: 01. proposing revisions in the projects prior to the full investigation; or 02. canceling funding for compliance problems (as in case 01, for example). This datum shows how civil society acted with the purpose of contributing to force the Bank to investigate or adopt revisions in the projects. It also reveals how the Bank proved to be permeable to requesters. Graph 02 summarizes data on the admissibility of requests.
Accountability in International Organizations: the case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993 (2017) 11 (1) e0002 -18/28 We also observed the extent to which political regimes interfere with the role of civil society in the formulation of requests. Graph 05, then, displays information on the intersection between political regimes and the type of request. Only cases in which the political regime could be classified were considered (98). The only case issued by a company was excluded because the objective was to evaluate the association between the political regime and the performance of civil society in the formulation of requests (N = 97). World Bank Inspection Panel (1993 (2017) 11 (1) This is the case, for example, with a request for inspection by an international NGO representing the local population of China (TREAKE, FOX and CLARK, 2003, p. 251) . In order to avoid retaliation, people affected by the projects ask for their anonymity in the majority of cases or prefer the petition to be presented on their behalf by organized civil society actors. This datum shows that organized civil society contributes to monitor Bank-financed projects, especially in authoritarian contexts, where organized civil society acts with less risk of retaliation.
The information and data presented above show how civil society actions Woods and Narlikar (2001, pp. 572-573) . Civil society seeks, however, to influence the behavior of States and make them sensitive to the demands of greater accountability. Of course, the results of the action of civil society depend on existing political regimes. However, even in countries governed by authoritarian regimes it is possible to identify the presence of social actors in the formulation of requests to the Panel, as was shown in Graph 05. Civil society's role in monitoring is essential to inform states about the performance of IOs and to keep them more accountable for their actions. In this way, the most powerful states will have the elements to impose sanctions on organizations (such as suspending on lending) and to ensure that the actions they take fail to produce negative social and environmental impacts (BUNTAINE, 2015, p. 100) .
Accountability in International Organizations: the case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993 (2017) Considering the three lines of action listed above, studies on accountability in international politics cannot disregard the role of civil society in the functioning of accountability mechanisms of international organizations. In these studies, the concept of social accountability is adequate to the development of empirical studies.
Final considerations
The concept of social accountability was designed to examine accountability, especially in those democratic experiences where traditional accountability mechanisms fail or prove to be insufficient. This is what O'Donnell (1998, p. 28) observed when examining the countries which, according to him, had 'weak or intermittent' horizontal accountability. To a certain extent, international politics is similar to the reality of democracies in these countries (part of them located in Latin America). The democratic experiences of these countries allow us to assess the problems and limits of accountability in international politics. For Dahl (1994 Dahl ( , 1999 such as IOs (NYE and KEOHANE, 1971; MERLE, 1981) . They are actors with their own interests and resources that seek to influence the decision-making processes in national states and IOs; 02. because of the possibility of these actors to contribute to attenuate (but not eliminate) the democratic deficit (MORAVSCIK, 2004) of international politics, considering the practical difficulties to operationalize accountability.
In concrete terms, the experience of the Inspection Panel has shown that social actors contribute to the functioning of one of the main mechanisms of accountability of
IOs. This experience shows the possibility of transposing to international politics the argument used by Smulovitz (2002, 2006) to highlight the importance of social accountability. In other words, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) and O'Donnell 
